We investigate the collective decision problem with incomplete information and side payments. We show that for generic prior distributions, there exists a direct mechanism associated with the social choice function that satisfies budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality. We consider the possibility of a risk-averse principal's extracting the full surplus in agency problems with adverse selection. We also show that for generic prior distributions, there exists a modified direct mechanism associated with the virtual social choice function, which satisfies budget balancing and interim individual rationality, such that truth telling is the unique triple iteratively undominated message rule profile.
Introduction
This paper investigates the collective decision problem with incomplete information where players' utilities are quasi-linear. Each player receives her private signal, and makes a public announcement about what is her private signal. Based on players' announcements, and according to the mechanism that players have constructed and agreed to enforce in advance, players collectively choose an alternative and make budget balancing side payments. Players' utilities may depend not only on her private signal but also on the other players' private signals, i.e., the private signal structure may satisfy the interdependent value assumption. Moreover, their private signals may have information about payoff-irrelevant factors such as their interim outside values.
Since players' private signals are not contractible, each player may misrepresent her private signal without being punished for lying. Moreover, after receiving her private signal implying that her interim outside value is higher than the interim expected utility that she can obtain in the collective decision, each player may have incentive not to participate in the collective decision. Hence, it would be very important for players to construct a mechanism with budget balancing that satisfies incentive compatibility in that truth telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and also satisfies interim individual rationality in that by participating in the collective decision after receiving her private signal, each player can always obtain the interim expected utility that is larger than or equals her interim outside value. 1 More ideally, truth telling should be described by the unique equilibrium behavior, and we should reach the uniqueness by operating only a small number of iterative removals of undominated strategies.
2
The first purpose of this paper is to show a sufficient condition on the prior distribution, under which, irrespective of the social choice function, there exists a direct mechanism that satisfies budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality. We show that such a direct mechanism exists for generic prior distributions, when there exist three or more players, their private signals are correlated, and the size of the set of each player's private signals is approximately set. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed an impossibility result that in a model of bilateral trading with independent private signals, private values, and zero interim outside values, there exist no such mechanisms. In contrast, this paper shows the possibility result when the number of players is three or more and the private signals are correlated. Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1995) showed that with three or more players and correlated signals, there exists a mechanism satisfying incentive compatibility, interim individual rationality, and a weaker version of budget balancing 1 There exist many works on mechanism design with side payments, showing their respective existence theorems of budget balancing mechanisms with incentive compatibility that do not necessarily satisfy interim individual rationality. See D'Aspremont and Gerard- Varet (1979) , Arrow (1979) , D'Aspremont, Gerard-Varet (1990, 2002) , Crèmer and Riordan (1985) , Rob (1989) , Aoyagi (1998) , Chung (1999) , and others. 2 There exist a huge volume of works on unique implementation with incomplete information. See the survey by Palfrey (1992) . Most of the works assumed that no side payments or only small side payments are allowed, and therefore, required a social choice function to be incentive compatible with no side payments as being necessary for its implementability. On the other hand, this paper allows large side payments, and does not require incentive compatibility of the social choice function without side payments.
that the expected value of the sum of side payments is non-positive. In contrast, this paper fully requires budget balancing that the sum of side payments is always zero.
As a corollary of the above result, we show that a player can extract the full surplus even with the constraints of incentive compatibility, interim individual rationality, and budget balancing. McLean (1985, 1988) showed that a principal can extract the full surplus in a multi-agent problem, where there exist three or more agents who receive their private signal, but the principal receive no private signals. In contrast, this paper shows that the full surplus extraction is possible even when all players including the principal receive their private signals. McAfee and Reny (1992) showed that in the model of bilateral trading a la Myerson and Satterthwaite, with continuums of signals and correlated signals, there exists a mechanism with budget balancing and incentive compatibility such that the seller can virtually extract the full surplus. Here, the maximal value of side payments diverges infinity as the agents' total rent approaches to zero. In contrast, this paper shows that the full surplus extraction is exactly possible even with bounded transfers.
As an application, we consider agency problems in which a risk-averse uninformed principal hires multiple risk-neutral agents with private information. We show that either with two agents or with independent private signals, it might be impossible for the principal to extract the full surplus. On the other hand, we show that with three or more agents and correlated signals, it is generically possible.
Although most previous works on agency problems with adverse selection concentrated on the case of risk-neutral principals, the study of risk-averse principals might have high potential ability to explain real economic phenomena. As its example, we consider auctions with a risk-averse seller and multiple risk-neutral buyers, showing the possibility of the seller extracting the full surplus without harming incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality of the buyers.
The second purpose of this paper is to show sufficient conditions under which there exist a mechanism with budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality such that truth telling is the unique iteratively undominated strategy profile, where we need only two or three rounds of iterative removal of undominated strategies. In particular, with private values and with four or more players, even if we restrict our attention to direct mechanisms, unique implementation in terms of twice iterative dominance might be generically possible. Moreover, we show that even without any substantial restriction on utility functions such as private values, unique and virtual implementation in terms of triple iterative dominance may be generically possible by using slightly modified direct mechanisms. That is, unique and virtual implementation is generically possible when players' interim preferences are not common knowledge. Abreu and Matsushima (1992) showed the possibility of uniquely and virtually implementing social choice functions in terms of iterative dominance. Abreu and Matsushima used only small side payments, constructed mechanisms that are much more complicated than direct mechanisms, and needed so many rounds of iterative removal in order to reach the unique strategy profile. Several experimental reports, however, indicate that real individuals are boundedly rational so that they may stop calculating the unique profile after practicing only second or third iterative removals. Hence, the use of only a small number of iterative removals would be an important restriction in practice. From the above viewpoint of bounded rationality, the present paper constructed only simple mechanisms and uses only two or three rounds of iterative removal in order to reach the unique profile.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 defines the model. Section 3 investigates direct mechanisms satisfying budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality. Both Sections 4 and 5 investigate the possibility of the full surplus extraction. Section 4 considers the agency problem with a risk-averse principal and multiple risk neutral agents. Section 5 considers the partnership problem with risk-neutral players. Section 6 shows a sufficient condition on the prior distribution under which the existence of mechanisms with interim individual rationality is trivial. Section 7 investigates the possibility of uniquely implementing the social choice function via direct mechanisms in terms of iterative dominance. Sections 8 and 9 investigate the possibility of uniquely and virtually implementing the social choice function in terms of iterative dominance. Section 10 concludes.
The Model
Let denote the finite set of players. We will assume that except in Proposition 1 of this section, in Proposition 3 of Section 3, and in the first part of Proposition 4 of Section 4. Each player receives her private signal , and denotes the finite set of private signals for player i . Let Ω , , and Ω . A private signal profile ω is randomly drawn according to a common prior distribution . We assume that has full support, i.e., for all ω . The conditional probabilities are denoted by
where and . For every subset , we denote
Let denote the set of alternatives. Let denote the set of simple lotteries on . We assume that each player utility is quasi-linear in that when the private signal profile and the alternative are and respectively and player receives the side payment , her utility is given by
We assume the expected utility hypothesis. For every simple lottery , we will write , where is the support of the lottery α that is countable. A social choice function is defined by , where is regarded as the alternative that is desirable when the private signal profile is .
, we denote by the set of messages for player i . Let . A message rule for player is defined as a function . Let denote the set of message rules for player . Let and φ .
where is an outcome function, is a side payment function for player , and is a side payment function that is budget balancing in that
When all players announce a message profile , the resultant lottery and side payment for each player i are and respectively. When is a degenerate lottery, it will be regarded as a pure alternative. 
A message rule profile is said to be k times iteratively undominated in if . We will use the concepts of iterative dominance only in the latter part of this paper, i.e., in Sections 6, 7, 8, and 9, where we will consider only the case of . In all sections except Sections 6, 8, and 9, we consider only direct mechanisms where
and . Hence, a direct mechanism is denoted by , where ( f for all i . N ∈ We denote by the honest message rule profile in a direct mechanism where for all ω . Ω ∈
For every i
, and every ω , we denote by U the interim outside value that player can obtain when she observes her private signal and decides not to participate in the collective decision. We introduce the following requirement on .
Interim Individual Rationality (IIR): For every , and every ,
IIR requires that when all players announce messages honestly in the direct mechanism , the resultant interim expected utility for each player must be larger than or equal her interim outside value U , and therefore, each player has incentive to participate in the collective decision irrespective of her private signal. We assume that
which implies that the sum of players' ex ante expected utilities is greater than or equals the sum of players' ex ante expected outside values. The following proposition states that this assumption is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a budget balancing side payment function satisfying IIR. We denote , , and . 
Suppose that satisfies the equalities (2). Suppose that there exist i , ,
, and such that and . Then, for every ,
This implies that for all ω , and therefore, which is a contradiction. Hence, whenever satisfies the equalities (2), then there exists such that for all and all . From the inequality (3), it follows that
which implies the inequality (1).
Q.E.D.
In the same way as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can check that even if we can choose any set of message profiles , the inequality (1) is still necessary and sufficient for the existence of an indirect mechanism and a message rule profile satisfying that
and satisfying that when players announce messages according to the message rule profile , the resultant interim expected utility for each player is larger than or equals her interim outside value, i.e.,
We introduce the following requirement on .
x Incentive Compatibility (IC): For every , every , and every ,
IC implies that the honest message rule profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the direct mechanism .
Interim Individual Rationality and Incentive Compatibility
We introduce the following two conditions on . p
Condition 1: For every , the collection of probability distributions on given by
is linearly independent in that for every
, and every
for all , and for all .
Condition 2: For every i
, the collection of probability distributions on Ω given by
We must note that if 
arbitrarily. Suppose that the equalities (8) hold. Fix ( arbitrarily. Let
Note that the equalities (4) hold. It follows from Condition 1 that the equalities (5) hold, and therefore, for all ,
Since the above equalities hold for all , it follows that
Hence, it follows from the equalities (8) 
Note that the equalities (6) hold. Condition 2 implies that the equalities (7) hold, and therefore, for every , and every ,
From the above arguments and the inequality (1), we have proved that
which implies the inequality (9).
Q.E.D. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) investigated a model of bilateral trading and showed the non-existence of a budget-balancing side payment function satisfying IC and IIR. Their negative result depends on the assumptions that there exist only two players, i.e.,
, and that players' private signals are independent, i.e., for every i , is independent of . In contrast, Theorem 2 of this paper assumes that , and players' private signals are correlated. The following proposition states that when , there may exist no budget-balancing side payment function satisfying IC and IIR, irrespective of whether players' private signals are correlated.
, that the inequality (1) holds with equality, i.e.,
and that there exists such that
Then, there exists no budget-balancing side payment function that satisfies IIR and IC. x
Proof: From IIR and the equality (10), it must hold that for every i , and every ,
. From the theorem in Fan (1956) , it follows that there exists a budget-balancing side payment function that satisfies IIR and IC, if and only if for every , whenever
that for every i , and every ,
Note that satisfies the equalities (12). From the inequality (11), it follows that ) , ,
, which contradicts the inequality (13).
Q.E.D.
We must note that the inequality (11) holds if and U are very small. Hence, Proposition 3 implies that there may exists no budget balancing side payment function satisfying IC and IIR in the two-player case, if for every player there exists a private signal for this player such that the associated interim outside value is very small. Further implications will be shown in the next two sections.
Full Surplus Extraction by a Risk-Averse Principal
Consider the following situation in which a risk-averse principal hires risk-neutral agents. Each agent i receives her private signal , whereas the principal receives no private signal. Each agent announces her message in a direct mechanism (
where the side payment function may not be budget balancing. is an increasing and concave function. Each agent utility is given by . We assume that the interim outside value for each player is set equal to zero, i.e.,
In the same way as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can check that there exists a side payment function such that
for all ,
and for every , player interim expected utility always equals zero, i.e.,
Here, when all agents announce honestly according to , the principal receives a constant monetary amount irrespective of what is the true private signal profile, and therefore, the principal's expected utility is given by
Since is concave, this values is equivalent to the maximal expected utility for the principal with the constraints of IIR for all agents. We will say that the principal can extract the full surplus if there exists satisfying IC, IIR, and the equalities (14). In the same way as in the proofs of Theorem 2 and Proposition 3, we can prove the following proposition. 
Note that the inequality (15) holds in the two-player case if each player has high productivity when she receives the private signal , irrespective of the other player's private signal and the collective decision, in the sense that for every ,
Hence, the first part of Proposition 4 implies that the principal cannot extract the full surplus in the two-agent case if for each player there exists a private signal for this player with which her productivity is very high. On the other hand, the latter part of Proposition 4 implies that in the case of three or more agents, the principal can extract the full surplus for generic prior distributions, if 1
, and
As an example, we consider auctions with a single risk-averse seller and multiple risk-neutral buyers. The seller has one unit of commodity for sale. Each buyer private signal implies her own valuation, where is given by a finite set of positive real numbers. The set of alternatives is given by , where the alternative implies that the commodity is transferred to buyer . Hence, for every buyer ,
is efficient, i.e., for every , and every ,
The expected full surplus is given by . . We assume that each buyer's highest possible valuation is greater than the expected full surplus, i.e.,
This assumption is trivial when each buyer has the same highest possible valuation. We must note that when , this assumption implies the inequality (15). Hence, it follows from the first part of Proposition 4 that when there exist only two buyers, the risk-averse seller cannot extract the full surplus. On the other hand, the latter part of Proposition 4 implies that with three or more buyers, if
for all , then the full surplus extraction by the seller is generically possible.
Proposition 1 implies that if incentive compatibility is not required, the seller can always extract the full surplus even in the two-buyer case. Moreover, we can check that if, instead of requiring interim individual rationality, we require only ex ante individual rationality that 0
then the seller can extract the full surplus in a wide class of environments with two buyers. Suppose that ( satisfies the 'sorting' condition that for every i , every ) , f p } 2 , 1 { ∈ 4 Without any substantial change of our arguments, we can allow to be a lottery over multiple agents whose evaluations are the highest.
, and every , } /{
where is the smallest element of Ω that is larger than . Then, according to the standard analysis, it follows that for every i
, there exists such that
which satisfies incentive compatibility and ex ante individual rationality with equality. Hence, without interim individual rationality, the seller can extract the full surplus even in the two-buyer case.
Full Surplus Extraction by a Risk-Neutral Player
Fix any player i arbitrarily. We will say that player can extract the full surplus if there exists a budget-balancing side payment function satisfying IC and IIR where the properties of IIR hold with equality for every player except player , i.e., for every , and every , Crèmer and McLean (1985, 1988) investigated auctions with a single seller and three or more bidders, and showed that the seller can extract the full surplus if the bidders' private signals are correlated. Crèmer and McLean assumed that the seller receives no private signals. In contrast, the present paper permits the seller to receive her private signal and takes into account the constraints of IC and IIR for this seller as well as the bidders. The following proposition states that if there exists a player whose private signal is independent, player may not be able to extract the full surplus. 
Suppose that is independent of . Then, there exists no side payment
for player i such that for every ,
Proof: Suppose that satisfies the inequalities (19) and the equalities (20). Since is independent of , it must hold that s independent of . Hence, it follows from the equalities (20) that for every , 
This contradicts the inequalities (19).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 implies that if there exists a player such that is independent of , and the inequality (18) 
Uniqueness and Interim Individual Rationality
Condition 3: For every , the collection of probability functions on given by
Condition 4: The collection of probability functions on given by
We must note that if
for all , then Condition 3 holds for generic prior distributions. We must note that if
, then Condition 4 holds for generic prior distributions. 5 The following proposition will be useful to construct a side budget balancing payment function satisfying IIR without harming other properties such as incentive compatibility and uniqueness.
Proposition 7: Consider an arbitrary collection of functions
where for all , and
Suppose that satisfies Conditions 3 and 4. Then there exists a collection of functions such that
for all i , 
In the same way as in the proof of Theorem 2, it follows that whenever satisfies the equalities (22), then there exists such that
Hence, it follows from the equality (21) that the equality (23) holds, and therefore, we have shown that such a exists. Condition 4 implies that there exists such that
We specify as follows. For every ,
and . 
Q.E.D.
The following theorem states that under Conditions 3 and 4, the existence of a mechanism with budget balancing that implements the social choice function implies the existence of a mechanism with interim individual rationality as well as budget balancing that implements the social choice function, and therefore, interim individual rationality is a trivial requirement. 
Then, there exists a budget balancing side payment function such that x φ is the unique k times iteratively undominated message rule profile in , and it satisfies interim individual rationality in that for every , and every ,
Proof: From the inequality (24), it follows that there exists such that for every ,
, and for every , Hence, all we have to do from the next section is to show the existence of a budget balancing mechanism uniquely implementing the social choice function without explicitly requiring interim individual rationality.
Twice Iterative Dominance
We introduce the following condition on . p
Condition 5: For every , every , and every ,
We must note that if 2 1 ≥ Ω , then Condition 3 holds for generic prior distributions. We introduce the following conditions on . f Condition 6: There exists d such that for every , and every satisfying ,
Suppose that player 1's utility u is independent of , and that for every , player utility is independent of . These suppositions are regarded as a weaker version of the private value assumption that every player's utility is independent of the other players' private signals. Suppose that a social choice function is strictly efficient in that for every ,
We must note that Condition 6 holds in this case. 6 The following proposition states that under Condition 6, if 2 1 ≥ Ω , then for generic prior distributions there exists a direct mechanism with budget balancing in which truth telling is the unique twice iteratively undominated message rule profile. Proof: For every , we define a function in ways that for every
Condition 5 implies that for every , every , and every ,
Fix a positive real number k arbitrarily, and we specify as follows. For every ,
and for every ,
Note that is budget balancing. From the inequalities (25), it follows that for every sufficiently large , every , and every , if and , then
This implies that whenever player 1 announces honestly then all other players have strict incentive to announce honestly. Condition 6 implies that for every Φ ∈ φ , if , then
This implies that player 1 has strict incentive to announce honestly irrespective of what are the other players' message rules played. Hence, we have proved that is the unique twice iteratively undominated message rule profile in . Matsushima (1990a) showed a sufficient condition on the common prior distribution under which with private values, there exists a budget balancing side payment function such that truth telling is the unique twice iteratively undominated message rule profile when the social choice function is strictly efficient. This sufficient condition requires the linear independence of the conditional distributions, which is more restrictive than Condition 5. Hence, Proposition 9 is regarded as the generalization of Matsushima (1990a) . 8 7 This is based on the idea of proper scoring rules. For the application of proper scoring rules to mechanism design, see Johnson, Pratt, and Zeckhauser (1990) , Matsushima (1990b Matsushima ( , 1993 , Aoyagi (1998) , and others. 8 Arya, Glover, and Young (1995) also showed the possibility of uniquely and virtually implementing social choice functions in terms of twice iterative dominance on the private value assumption.
Virtual Implementation
Note that Condition 6 excludes a wide class of environments with interdependent values. The purpose of this section is to show that by using a modified version of direct mechanism, a social choice function is uniquely and, not exactly but virtually, implementable in terms of twice iterative dominance even in a wide class of environments with interdependent values. 9 We consider indirect mechanisms where the set of messages for each player is specified by
Each player makes two announcements about her private signals at one time. We denote and , where
The honest message profile is denoted by , where
, a mechanism ( is said to satisfy the closeness to if for every , 
Condition 7 implies that each player has different preferences over pure alternatives across her private signals. Since Condition 7 is weaker than Condition 4, we can say that it holds in a wide class of environments with interdependent values. We introduce the following condition on . p Condition 8: For every , there exists such that for every , and every , 
Proof: From Condition 7, it follows that for every i , there exist l n d such that for every ,
We specify by g
For every i
, we define a function s in ways that for every
Condition 8 implies that for every , and every ,
Fix a positive real number arbitrarily. We specify in ways that for every , and every ,
Note that is budget balancing and satisfies the closeness to . From the inequalities (26), it follows that for every , and every
. This implies that each player has strict incentive to make the honest announcement of her first message irrespective of what are the other players' messages announced. From the inequalities (27), it follows that for every sufficiently large , every , and every , if for all , and , then
This implies that whenever all players make the honest announcements of their first messages, then each player has strict incentive to make the honest announcement of her second message irrespective of what are the other players' second messages announced. Hence, we have proved that is the unique twice iteratively undominated message rule profile in .
Triple Iterative Dominance
Note that Condition 7 excludes an important class of environments in which each player's private signal may have only information about payoff-irrelevant factors such as interim outside values. As Matsushima (2002) has shown, no inconstant social choice function is uniquely implementable whenever players' private signals have no payoff-relevant information, and therefore, players' ex post preference profile is common knowledge in the sense that for every i , every , and every , there exists such that Serrano and Vohra (2001) also showed this point by providing an example with interim individual rationality. The purpose of this section is to show that by using another modification of direct mechanism, any inconstant social choice function is virtually implementable in terms of triple iterative dominance whenever players' interim preferences are not common knowledge. We introduce the following conditions on . ) , ( f p Condition 9: There exist a nonempty proper subset , two lotteries , , and two real numbers and that satisfy the following properties. The property (i) of Condition 9 implies that each player's interim preference is not common knowledge. Note that with private values, players' ex post preferences are not common knowledge only if the property (i) holds. Note that the property (ii) holds for generic prior distributions. We introduce the following condition on . Note that Condition 10 holds for generic prior distributions. Serrano and Vohra (2000) showed a condition on the prior distribution under which every incentive compatible social choice function is virtually implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Conditions 9 and 10 are weaker than this condition.
We consider indirect mechanisms where the set of messages for each player is specified by 
Conclusion
This paper investigated mechanism design with incomplete information and quasi-linearity. We showed that with three or more players and with a restriction on the size of the set of private signals for each player, there exists a side payment function that satisfies budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality. We showed that in agency problems with adverse selection, the risk-averse principal could extract the full surplus without harming the agents' incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. These possibility results depended on the assumptions that there exist three or more players and their private signals are correlated. We showed that the full surplus extraction might be impossible either when there exists only two players or when players' private signals are independent. We also investigated the possibility of uniquely implementing social choice functions by practicing only a small number of iterative removals of undominated strategies. We showed that whenever players' interim preferences are not common knowledge, then for generic prior distributions, every social choice function is uniquely and virtually implementable in terms of triple iterative dominance via a simple modification of direct mechanism.
